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HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN A DIGITAL AGE: WHO 
SHOULD BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE? 
Sona Movsisyan 
The Digital Age has transformed the way human traffickers conduct 
their “business.” Victims are not only trafficked and sexually exploited 
on the streets, but they are advertised and sold on web-pages, including 
escort and dating services and “adult” sections of online classifieds. 
Human trafficking has existed for centuries; however, international and 
domestic laws have just recently been crafted and implemented to 
address the lawless conduct. Consequently, laws have not caught up with 
technological advances, including the Internet and social media. At a 
click of a button, a “John” sitting in front of a computer can purchase a 
minor advertised online, and the trafficker remains anonymous 
throughout the process. The “John” and the trafficker can be prosecuted 
and held criminally liable for their role in sexually exploiting a child; 
however, the website that allows for such images to appear is shielded 
from liability. Human trafficking survivors have come forward and 
spoken out against protecting Internet Service Providers who help 
facilitate in their exploitation. They want every individual and entity who 
profited from their victimization held accountable. This paper seeks to 
address their concerns by analyzing and comparing current laws in the 
United States and the European Union to see what is working and what is 
missing. Most importantly, this paper will discuss possible legal 
measures and other non-formal solutions to prevent human trafficking, 
support victims, and stop perpetrators.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
540 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 27.3
   
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 541 
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON HUMAN TRAFFICKING: GLOBALLY ............. 542 
A. Statistics ....................................................................................... 543 
B. Forms of Human Trafficking ....................................................... 545 
C. Technology and Human Trafficking ........................................... 547 
III. UNITED STATES ................................................................................... 550 
A. Communications Decency Act and Backpage.com ..................... 552 
B. Case Law ..................................................................................... 556 
C. Congress’s Response ................................................................... 561 
a. The Report’s Findings ........................................................ 562 
b. Amending the Communications Decency Act .................... 566 
IV. EUROPE ................................................................................................ 569 
A. Websites Involved in Human Trafficking ................................... 570 
B. EU Laws on Human Trafficking and the Internet ....................... 574 
C. EU Member States’ Legal Measures ........................................... 580 
V. ANALYSIS ............................................................................................. 582 
VI. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 591 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2019] Human Trafficking in a Digital Age 541
  
I. INTRODUCTION 
“[If] you’re a drug trafficker, you can sell drugs once, [but if] you’re a 
human trafficker, you can sell a kid over and over and over again,” 
proclaimed the Executive Director of Covenant House Pennsylvania.1 
Human trafficking is a multi-billion-dollar criminal industry, making it 
an incredibly profitable crime that affects millions of people from around 
the globe.2 Human trafficking is not a recent phenomenon; instead, it is a 
form of modern-day slavery.3 It transcends borders, both nationally and 
internationally; it creates victims without discriminating against race, 
ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender, age, or socioeconomic status; and it 
often occurs unnoticed and undetected.4 Therefore, it is essential to bring 
attention to this horrendous crime and all its forms in order to prevent it 
from continuing and expanding under the radar.  
Human trafficking is a subject that grabs society’s attention and has 
been broadly discussed. The existing literature defines human trafficking, 
dispels common misconceptions associated with the crime, and discusses 
the various federal and state laws that penalize traffickers.5 However, the 
more social scientists reveal about human trafficking, the more apparent 
its complexities are. With the expansion of the Internet and advanced 
digital technology, new key players involved in trafficking are coming to 
light.6 Human trafficking no longer just involves the traffickers, pimps, 
and Johns who sell or exploit victims, but also the Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs) who profit from facilitating and assisting with the 
  
 1. I AM JANE DOE (50 Eggs Films Feb. 10, 2017), 
https://www.netflix.com/title/80167459.   
 2. The Facts, POLARIS PROJECT, https://polarisproject.org/facts (last visited Feb. 
10, 2019) [hereinafter The Facts]. 
 3. What is Human Trafficking?, U.S. DEP’T JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/humantrafficking/what-is-human-trafficking (last updated Jan. 6, 
2017); see generally Human Trafficking, POLARIS PROJECT, 
https://polarisproject.org/human-trafficking (last visited Feb. 11, 2019). 
 4. What is Human Trafficking?, supra note 3.  
 5. See e.g., 2016 U.S. DEP’T ST. TRAFFICKING PERSONS REP.; Commercial 
Sexual Exploitation of Children and Sex Trafficking, Literature Review, OFF. JUV. JUST. 
& DELINQ. PREVENTION, https://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/litreviews/CSECSexTrafficking.pdf 
(last updated Aug. 2014).  
 6. See generally I AM JANE DOE, supra note 1.  
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crime.7 This article addresses the role ISPs play in human trafficking, 
particularly child sex trafficking. It will analyze and compare how the 
United States8 and the European Union9 have tackled this issue, focusing 
on legislation, case law, and actual instances of online trafficking. 
Additionally, it will highlight various perspectives and approaches in 
order to answer the question of whether ISPs should be held legally 
liable (meaning civil liability) for content posted by third-parties.10  
The issue of online human trafficking and ISP involvement is not 
black and white. ISPs cannot be divided into categories and labeled 
either a platform versus a publisher/developer, thereby shielding ISPs 
from liability for third-party content. There are ISPs that overstep their 
boundaries and knowingly participate, facilitate, and illegally edit the 
content of advertisements for commercial sex with minors in order to 
make a profit. Therefore, laws need to exist that address these instances 
and hold ISPs accountable for their roles in furthering human trafficking. 
The United States (U.S.) and European Union (EU) Member States have 
established laws for ISP liability;11 however, they are insufficient 
because they provide immunity, not accountability. This article will 
compare the legal frameworks of the U.S. and the EU to get a better 
understanding of what has worked and what still needs improvement. 
However, the essence of this article is that implementing laws that 
remove ISP immunity is not the only solution, but instead, cooperation 
and collaboration between ISPs and law enforcement agencies is key if 
progress is to be made.  
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON HUMAN TRAFFICKING: GLOBALLY  
The United Nations defines human trafficking under Article 3, 
paragraph (a) of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, which was put into force on December 25, 2003, 
as the: 
  
 7. Id. 
 8. See infra Part III. 
 9. See infra Part IV. 
 10. See infra Part V. 
 11. See infra Part III Section A, Part IV Section B.   
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recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, 
by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of 
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position 
of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to 
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for 
the purpose of exploitation.
12
 
Exploitation includes “sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, 
slavery, . . . [domestic] servitude [and] the removal of organs.”13 The 
Protocol “is the first global legally binding instrument with an agreed 
definition on trafficking in persons,” and the definition is meant to 
provide nations a basis to establish their own domestic criminal 
offenses.14  
A. Statistics  
Statistics on human trafficking are not always accurate or reliable for 
several reasons. First, many victims of human trafficking are often never 
detected because either first responders are not trained to identify or 
understand a trafficking situation, or many victims are afraid to come 
forward.15 The figures, therefore, are considered to be under-
representative.16 Second, no comprehensive law enforcement database 
  
 12. U.N. Off. on Drug & Crime, Human Trafficking, 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/what-is-human-trafficking.html 
(citing G.A. Res. 55/25, annex II, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime, art.3, ¶ (a) (Dec. 25, 2003)). 
 13. Id.  
 14. U.N. Off. on Drug & Crime, United Nations Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto, 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2019).  
 15. See INST. OF MED./NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT, CONFRONTING 
COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND SEX TRAFFICKING OF MINORS IN THE UNITED 
STATES: A GUIDE FOR THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR 13–15 (2014); see also AMY FARRELL, 
JACK MCDEVITT & STEPHANIE FAHY, UNDERSTANDING AND IMPROVING LAW 
ENFORCEMENT RESPONSES TO HUMAN TRAFFICKING: FINAL REPORT 14, 20–21 (June 
2008). Jane White, Director, MICHIGAN HUMAN TRAFFICKING TASK FORCE; see Jane 
White, Dir., Mich. Human Trafficking Task Force, Train the Trainer (Dec. 11-12, 2014).  
 16. See FARRELL ET AL., supra note 15, at 14 (“Despite efforts to estimate the 
numbers and record the characteristics of trafficking victims, large gaps remain in the 
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exists to count the number of human trafficking cases globally.17 Third, 
the figures do not always account for all forms of trafficking and 
generally focus primarily on sex trafficking.18 Therefore, it is important 
to depend on statistics that are produced from credible and reliable 
sources that explain their methodology so the audience understands what 
the numbers are referencing. The International Labour Organization 
(ILO) released a new comprehensive study in 2017, stating: “[a]s no 
single source provides suitable and reliable data for all forms of modern 
slavery, a combined methodology has been adopted, drawing on a variety 
of data sources as required.”19 Specifically, ILO used “54 specially 
designed, national probabilistic surveys involving interviews with more 
than 71,000 respondents across 48 countries.” In order to estimate the 
forced sexual and labor exploitation of children, ILO also relied on the 
database created by the International Organization for Migration for the 
number of trafficked victims assisted.20 From the data collected between 
2012-2016, ILO estimated that “40.3 million people were victims of 
modern slavery in 2016.”21 Of those 40.3 million victims, 24.9 million 
people were exploited for forced labor, meaning “they were being forced 
to work under threat or coercion as domestic workers, on construction 
sites, in clandestine factories, on farms and fishing boats, in other 
sectors, and in the sex industry.”22 Within the forced labor statistics, 
forced sexual exploitation of adults and children accounted for 4.8 
  
area of data collection, which significantly limits our knowledge about the scale of 
trafficking. . . .”).  
 17. Id. at 13, 14. It is difficult to measure the prevalence of human trafficking 
because currently “no empirically valid analyses of the incidence of human trafficking 
exist.” Id. at 13. Another difficulty with collecting reliable data is that trafficking crimes 
often overlap with various other crimes, such as smuggling, prostitution, sexual assault, 
etc. Id. at 14.  
 18. Id. at 15 (“attempts to measure the extent of human trafficking and describe 
the characteristics of either victims or offenders have generally been confined to 
particular types of trafficking [] e.g. commercial sex trafficking”).  
 19. INT’L LABOUR ORG., GLOBAL ESTIMATES OF MODERN SLAVERY: FORCED 
LABOUR AND FORCED MARRIAGE 11 (2017), available at 
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_575479.pdf [hereinafter GLOBAL ESTIMATES]. 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. at 9, 12.   
 22. Id. at 9–10 (emphasis added).  
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million people.23 Even though human trafficking affects both men and 
women, women accounted for “28.7 million, or 71 [%] of the overall 
total,” illustrating the disproportionate impact and gender-based nature of 
this crime.24 Specifically, “women and girls represent[ed] 99[%] of 
victims of forced labour in the commercial sex industry.”25 Additionally, 
children were significantly affected with estimates that “one in four” 
children suffered from human trafficking.26 Children accounted for 21% 
of the victimized population for commercial sex, which does not include 
proving the elements of force, fraud, or coercion, since the victims are 
minors.27 Additionally, ILO estimates that the human trafficking industry 
accumulates a profit stream of $150 billion.28  
B. Forms of Human Trafficking 
As mentioned, human trafficking consists of both labor and sex 
trafficking.29 Even though this paper primarily addresses sex trafficking 
of minors, it is important to shed light on the other situations in which 
human trafficking occurs. Labor trafficking involves the “use of 
violence, threats, lies, debt bondage, or other forms of coercion to force 
people to work against their will in . . . [various] industries.”30 Labor 
traffickers lure victims into terrible working conditions by “mak[ing] 
false promises of a high-paying job” or educational opportunities.31 
However, the reality is that the perpetrators control all the victim’s 
earnings, and the victims work longer hours than initially agreed upon, 
often in inhumane conditions as domestic servants, farmworkers, or 
factory workers.32 Once victims are at the mercy of their trafficker, it is 
  
 23. Id. at 10.  
 24. Id. at 10.  
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. at 5. 
 27. Id. at 10. 
 28. The Facts, supra note 2.  
 29. Types of Human Trafficking, INTERPOL, https://www.interpol.int/Crime-
areas/Trafficking-in-human-beings/Types-of-human-trafficking (last visited Jan. 30, 
2019).  
 30. Labor Trafficking, POLARIS PROJECT, https://polarisproject.org/human-
trafficking/labor-trafficking (last visited Jan. 30, 2019).    
 31. Id. 
 32. Id.  
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very hard for them to escape or seek assistance.33 Victims are often 
undocumented, they are extremely fearful of getting caught due to the 
psychological and physical abuse they have experienced, and they are 
kept isolated from society.34  
Similarly, sex traffickers also use violence, threats, “lies, debt 
bondage, and other forms of coercion to [force] adults and children to 
engage in commercial sex acts against their will.”35 The situations that 
sex trafficking victims face are unlike what is portrayed by media outlets 
and Hollywood films.36 Victims are not usually kidnapped or held 
hostage in basements; instead, many victims initially become 
romantically involved with someone and then are groomed, forced or 
manipulated into prostitution, resulting in the “boyfriend” or “pimp” 
collecting all the earnings.37 Other victims may be lured in with false 
promises of a job, such as modeling, but are forced to work at strip clubs 
or brothels instead.38 Additionally, some victims are forced to sell sex by 
their parents or other family members for a pay-off.39 Victims of 
trafficking may be in the situation for a few days or weeks, or may 
remain controlled for years. The reasons discussed for why labor 
trafficking victims do not seek support or assistance also apply to many 
sex trafficking victims.40 However, unlike labor trafficking, there is an 
additional layer because many sex trafficking victims are controlled 
through drugs and alcohol and “are heavily conditioned to remain loyal 
  
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Sex Trafficking, POLARIS PROJECT, https://polarisproject.org/human-
trafficking/sex-trafficking (last visited Jan. 30, 2019).  
 36. See The Muse, Human Trafficking: The Myths and the Realities, FORBES 
(Jan. 24, 2012, 1:06 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/dailymuse/2012/01/24/human-
trafficking-the-myths-and-the-realities/#77446e3876e7.  
 37. See Gabrielle Fonrouge, The sick tactics sex traffickers use to find victims, 
N.Y. POST (Apr. 17, 2018), https://nypost.com/2018/04/17/how-sex-traffickers-hunt-for-
victims-and-brainwash-them/; see also Human Trafficking Myths and Facts, POLARIS 
PROJECT, https://polarisproject.org/human-trafficking-myths-and-facts (last visited Mar. 
31, 2019).  
 38. The Muse, supra note 36.  
 39. Id. 
 40. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.  
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to [their] trafficker.”41 Victims of sex trafficking often “includ[e] 
runaway and homeless youth, as well as victims of domestic violence, 
sexual assault, war, or social discrimination.”42 One commonality 
between labor and sex traffickers is that both target vulnerable 
populations: victims that they believe are easier to control and will not 
seek help.43 
C. Technology and Human Trafficking  
Technological advances such as the Internet and mobile smart phones 
have made sex trafficking, particularly with children, a more “convenient 
worldwide marketing channel.”44 The Internet and social media have 
allowed individuals to easily “advertise, schedule, and purchase sexual 
encounters with minors.”45 These technologies have “also allow[ed] 
pimps and traffickers to reach a larger clientele base than in the past,” 
heightening the dangers and risks associated with sexual exploitation.46 
In 2016, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children 
(NCMEC) reported, based on information collected from the U.S., an 
846% increase from 2010 to 2015 in reports of suspected child sex 
trafficking, which the organization attributed to be “directly correlated to 
the increased use of the Internet to sell children for sex.”47 The statistics 
are similar globally. In 2011, the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) 
received 12,752 reports of child sexual abuse images online worldwide;48 
compared to 2016, when IWF received 57,335 reports of websites 
  
 41. Child Sex Trafficking, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/criminal-
ceos/child-sex-trafficking (last updated July 25, 2017).  
 42. Sex Trafficking, supra note 35.  
 43. The Victims & Traffickers, POLARIS PROJECT, 
https://polarisproject.org/victims-traffickers (last visited Jan. 30, 2019).  
 44. Child Sex Trafficking, supra note 41.  
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 114TH CONG., REP. 
ON BACKPAGE.COM’S KNOWING FACILITATION OF ONLINE SEX TRAFFICKING 4 (Comm. 
Print 2017) (testimony of Yiota G. Souras, Senior Vice President & General Counsel, 
National Center for Missing & Exploited Children) [hereinafter SENATE COMM. REP.]. 
 48. INTERNET WATCH FOUND., ANNUAL AND CHARITY REPORT 14 (2011) 
[hereinafter 2011 IWF REPORT]. 
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containing child sexual abuse imagery.49 Of those websites, in 2011, 440 
were used for commercial sexual abuse,50 whereas, in 2016, 5,452 were 
for commercial sexual abuse,51 a significant increase. In 2016, the 
majority of child sexual abuse webpages were hosted in Europe and 
North America, and the top two countries included the Netherlands and 
the U.S.52 Furthermore, EUROPOL stated that there have been several 
European and worldwide operations that identified thousands of suspects 
for acts committed against children, with the numbers growing due to the 
proliferation of child sexual exploitation material on the internet.53  
Previously, sex trafficking took place “on the streets, at casinos and 
truck stops, and in other physical locations,” but now the exchanges 
occur predominantly online, making sex trafficking an even more 
lucrative and unmonitored industry.54 The Internet is appealing to sex 
traffickers “because of the high profitability and relatively low risk 
associated with advertising trafficking victims’ services online.”55 
Traffickers can, by the click of a button, maximize profits by connecting 
to buyers through online advertisements, while maintaining anonymity 
throughout the entire process.56 “The Internet offers traffickers 
unprecedented opportunities, which they have been quick to exploit.”57 
Generally, traffickers are able to evade law enforcement due to security 
  
 49. INTERNET WATCH FOUND., IWF ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2016) [hereinafter 2016 
IWF REPORT].  
 50. 2011 IWF REPORT, supra note 48, at 15.  
 51. 2016 IWF REPORT, supra note 49, at 17.  
 52. Id. at 12; see also Eur. Consult. Ass., Group of Specialists on the Impact of 
the Use of New Information Technologies on Trafficking in Human Beings for the 
Purpose of Sexual Exploitation, EG-S-NT 9 rev.,  
29 (Sept. 16, 2003), available at https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/publications/group-
specialists-impact-use-new-information-technologies-trafficking-human-beings_en 
[hereinafter Specialists Report] (explaining how child pornography cases skyrocketed 
from 215 in 1997 to 1128 in 1999, which was attributed to the increased volume of 
pornographic websites available online).  
 53. EUROPOL, CHILD SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 2010 FACT SHEET 2 (2010).  
 54. SENATE COMM. REP., supra note 47, at 5 (quoting Aff. Of Staca Shehan, 
Backpage.com LLC v. Dart, No. 15-cv-6340, Doc. 88-4. ¶ 17 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 6, 2015)). 
 55. Id. 
 56. See generally Athanassia P. Sykiotou, (Lecturer in Criminology) Directorate 
Gen. of Human Rights and Legal Affairs, Council of Eur., Trafficking in human beings: 
Internet recruitment, at 21-22, EG-THB-INT (2007). 
 57. Id. at 18.  
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and privacy protections associated with online websites, as well as the 
ability to remain anonymous with certain online features.58 Online sex 
trafficking has become so common in the U.S. that police note that when 
they receive a report for a missing child, depending on what city they are 
in, the first place they look is the Internet.59  
Online sex trafficking is closely intertwined with child pornography 
because traffickers post inappropriate photos of children on certain 
websites, while simultaneously selling the child for specific sexual acts.60 
The production of such images creates “a permanent record of a child’s 
abuse” and allows for the victimization of the child to continue, since 
many of the images are difficult to remove once they are disseminated 
online.61 Therefore, “[t]he children exploited in these images must live 
with the permanency, longevity, and circulation of such a record of their 
sexual victimization.”62 Not only is being sold for sexual exploitation 
extremely traumatizing for victims, but the images create lasting 
psychological damages to a child.63 Therefore, it is essential to hold 
individuals, including ISPs, accountable for exploiting children and those 
most vulnerable.  
  
 58. See MEREDITH DANK ET AL., ESTIMATING THE SIZE AND STRUCTURE OF THE 
UNDERGROUND COMMERCIAL SEX ECONOMY IN EIGHT MAJOR US CITIES 88 (2014), 
available at https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/22376/413047-
estimating-the-size-and-structure-of-the-underground-commercial-sex-economy-in-eight-
major-us-cities_0.pdf (noting that “online advertising provides more of a cover from law 
enforcement than the street”).  
 59. I AM JANE DOE, supra note 1; see also MEREDITH DANK ET AL., supra note 58, 
at 68 (explaining that law enforcement officials in Dallas “believed that the Internet has 
shifted many of the adults and minors previously found on the street indoors”). In San 
Diego, police officers noted similar sentiments, “I think that [the Internet] is the driver as 
to why this is becoming such a huge problem, because there’s probably only five places 
where you have street walkers in San Diego . . . they’re in very limited areas.” Id. at 102. 
The study as a whole found that “widespread availability and rapid expansion of the 
Internet has redefined the spatial and social limitations of the sex market by introducing 
new markets for both recruitment and advertisement.” Id. at 3.  
 60. See generally Specialists Report, supra note 52, at 29.  
 61. Child Pornography, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/criminal-
ceos/child-pornography (last updated July 25, 2017). 
 62. Id.  
 63. Id.; See also Specialists Report, supra note 52, at 29 (“Each time a picture is 
assessed for sexual purposes it victimizes the individual concerned.”).  
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III. UNITED STATES  
In the U.S., trafficking individuals is a federal crime.64 The gravity of 
this crime is visible when looking at a few key statistics.65 The National 
Human Trafficking Hotline (NHTH), operated by Polaris, stated that in 
2017, it received 26,557 calls of suspected human trafficking and 6,081 
reported cases of sex trafficking.66 Of those cases, 519 involved sexual 
exploitation via an online ad.67 Additionally, since 2007, the NHTH has 
received 34,700 reports of sex trafficking instances in the U.S.68 Lastly, 
NCMEC estimates in its 2018 report that, based off the nearly 23,500 
runaways reported, one in seven were likely victims of child sex 
trafficking.69 The rise in human trafficking victims and cases led 
Congress to take action in 2000 by passing the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act (TVPA), the first comprehensive legislation, which 
focused on the three main “P’s:” prevention, prosecution, and 
protection.70 In addition, the Act founded the Office to Monitor and 
Combat Trafficking in Persons, which is responsible for releasing a 
Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report every year for each country, detailing 
any progress or set-backs that have occurred with regards to combatting 
all forms of human trafficking.71 The TVPA has had four 
reauthorizations since its enactment, including in 2003, 2005, 2008, and 
2013.72 During each reauthorization, additional provisions were 
introduced to provide further support and protection to survivors, such as 
  
 64. Federal Law, NAT’L HUM. TRAFFICKING HOTLINE, 
https://humantraffickinghotline.org/what-human-trafficking/federal-law (last visited Feb. 
27, 2018).  
 65. See generally Sex Trafficking, supra note 35; Hotline Statistics, NAT’L HUM. 
TRAFFICKING HOTLINE, https://humantraffickinghotline.org/states (last visited Feb. 11, 
2019).  
 66. Hotline Statistics, supra note 65.  
 67. Id.  
 68. Sex Trafficking, supra note 35.  
 69. Child Sex Exploitation, NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILD. 
(NCMEC), http://www.missingkids.org/footer/media/keyfacts (last visited Feb. 11, 
2019).  
 70. Current Federal Laws, POLARIS, https://polarisproject.org/current-federal-
laws (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).  
 71. Id.   
 72. Id. 
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establishing a federal civil right of action for victims to sue their 
traffickers.73  
Additionally, the U.S. has specific criminal offenses that make it 
illegal to traffic persons.74 The relevant sections include 18 U.S. Code § 
1591, Sex trafficking of children or by force, fraud, or coercion, which 
states,  
(a) Whoever knowingly-  
(1) […] recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, 
advertises, maintains, patronizes, or solicits by any means a person; 
or 
(2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from 
participation in a venture which has engaged in an act described in 
violation of paragraph (1). 
75
 
As well as 18 U.S. Code § 1595, Civil Remedy, which states in 
pertinent part, 
(a) An individual who is a victim of a violation of this chapter may 
bring a civil action against the perpetrator (or whoever knowingly 
benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from 
participation in a venture which that person knew or should have 
known has engaged in an act in violation of this chapter) . . . [to recover 
damages].
76
 
Not only are there federal laws prohibiting human trafficking, but 
individual states have enacted similar legislation making it a criminal and 
  
 73. Id. This provision has been used to go against other third-party participants of 
human trafficking, but not Internet Service Providers. See generally Alexandra F. Levy, 
Federal Human Trafficking Civil Litigation: 15 Years of the Private Right of Action, 
HUMAN TRAFFICKING LEGAL CTR. (Dec. 2018), http://www.htlegalcenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/Federal-Human-Trafficking-Civil-Litigation-1.pdf.  
 74. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581–1597.  
 75. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1)–(2) (2013).  
 76. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (2018).  
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civil offense as well.77 States have recently implemented laws targeting 
human traffickers, and therefore, many laws are still being improved and 
developed.78 The first state to criminalize human trafficking was 
Washington in 2003.79 Since then, every state has enacted legislation to 
hold traffickers criminally responsible for profiting from forced labor or 
sexual servitude.80 The state laws do not all mirror the federal law, 
because states provide different variations for human trafficking 
definitions, statutory requirements, elements of the crime, and offenses.81  
A. Communications Decency Act and Backpage.com 
The U.S. Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act (CDA), 
also called Title V of the Telecommunications Act, in 1996 in “an 
attempt to regulate obscenity and indecency online,”82 primarily 
addressing concerns about minors’ access to pornography on the 
internet.83 The CDA amended the telecommunications law by making it a 
criminal offense to knowingly transmit “obscene” or “indecent” 
  
 77. Human Trafficking State Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/human-trafficking-laws.aspx (last 
visited Feb. 26, 2019); 18 U.S.C. § 1595; see also COLLEEN OWENS ET AL., IDENTIFYING 
CHALLENGES TO IMPROVE THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF STATE AND LOCAL 
HUMAN TRAFFICKING CASES 246 (Apr. 2012), available at 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/25526/412593-Identifying-
Challenges-to-Improve-the-Investigation-and-Prosecution-of-State-and-Local-Human-
Trafficking-Cases.PDF (focusing on the Midwest region, stating a civil provision that 
provides an “affirmative defense clause for victims as well as access to compensation 
funds”). In the Western Region, a civil provision exists that allows human trafficking 
victims to sue for damages and other court costs for up to $250,000. Id. at 247. In the 
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to include human trafficking.” Id. at 250. Another option is the possibility to receive 
restitution from the trafficker if found guilty of trafficking. Id. at 252.  
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messages to an individual who is under the age of 18 years.84 
Additionally, it “prohibited knowingly sending or displaying a ‘patently 
offensive’ message containing sexual or excretory activities . . . to a 
minor.” 85 The Act did include “a defense to senders or displayers of 
online ‘indecent’ materials if they took reasonable good-faith efforts to 
exclude children.”86 Once the legislation was put into effect, practical 
issues arose that affected both ISPs and businesses.87 For instance, at the 
time, it was cumbersome for a sender to screen out minors; therefore, it 
was difficult for senders and displayers to know if they were within the 
exception.88 Some ISPs could request credit card information to validate 
that the user was over the age of 18; however, that prevented them from 
conducting business with adults who did not have a credit card.89 
Furthermore, the terms of the legislation “indecent” and “patently 
offensive” were ambiguous.90 Lastly, there were several free speech 
concerns, which ultimately led the Supreme Court to decide in Reno v. 
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), that certain provisions of the Act violated 
the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech.91 
Due to these concerns, Representatives Chris Cox (R-CA) and Ron 
Wyden (D-OR) introduced an amendment to the CDA, which became 
the notorious Section 230.92 Section 230(c), titled Protection for “Good 
Samaritan” Blocking and Screening of Offensive Material, states:   
(1) Treatment of Publisher or Speaker. No provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider. 
(2) Civil Liability. No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be held liable on account of –  
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 85. Id.  
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(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or 
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be 
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or 
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is 
constitutionally protected.
93
  
The rationale behind Section 230 was that online service providers 
would not be held liable for content published by third-parties, unlike 
newspaper publications that are accountable for the content they print.94 
The purpose of Section 230 was two-fold: first, it was to “encourage the 
unfettered and unregulated development of free speech on the Internet;” 
second, it “was to allow online services [the ability] to implement their 
own standards for policing content and provid[ing] for child safety.”95 
Essentially, Section 230 of the CDA, whether intentionally or 
accidentally, created federal immunity to most causes of actions that 
could otherwise result in ISP liability for information created by third-
party users96 However, exceptions for liability under federal criminal law 
and intellectual property law exist, but have not been readily applied.97 
Section 230 of the CDA was not struck down by the Supreme Court in 
Reno v. ACLU, like the other anti-indecency sections of the bill, because 
it was considered to be a provision that promoted free speech, not 
restrained it.98  
Section 230 of the CDA has had unforeseen implications due to the 
blanket immunity ISPs have received from civil and criminal litigation. 
The initial motivation to enact the CDA was to protect children from 
accessing pornography;99 ironically, it now protects websites who 
promote and facilitate commercial sex trafficking of minors. Case after 
case, courts have ruled that websites such as Backpage.com (Backpage) 
and Craigslist, cannot be held legally liable for content posted by third-
  
 93. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (1996) (emphasis added).  
 94. CDA 230: Legislative History, supra note 82.  
 95. Id. (quoting Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
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party users.100 There have been several monumental cases that have 
brought attention to not only the illegal activity occurring on Backpage, 
but the effects of Section 230.101 This focus has led Congress to rethink 
and deliberate whether Section 230 is actually protecting free speech or 
shielding criminals.102  
“The internet has provided traffickers with a remarkably easy and 
cost-effective way” to market and sell their product, i.e. human beings.103 
Websites such as Backpage are major online marketplaces for the sale of 
illegal sex, especially with children.104 Backpage operates in 97 countries 
with 943 locations worldwide.105 Backpage provides users the 
opportunity to advertise and post classified listings for a wide variety of 
products and services.106 Specifically, Backpage has an “adult” section 
that is considered “one of the most well-known online classified sites” 
for commercial sex trafficking.107 In 2010, Craigslist’s adult services 
section shut down due to concerns of sex trafficking, which resulted in 
Backpage taking over and expanding its services to include “the online 
prostitution business and is now ‘the nation’s leading publisher of online 
prostitution advertising.’” 108 Backpage has approximately 80% of the 
market for online sex ads.109 Nick McKinley, founder of Deliverfund, 
stated: “Backpage is the Walmart of Human Trafficking.”110 
Furthermore, Backpage’s “adult” section is the only section which 
Backpage charges a posting fee and is the section that brings in the most 
  
 100. Id.   
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 102. See generally id.   
 103. Brief of Amici Curiae at 12, J.S. v. Village Voice Media Holdings, L.L.C., 
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revenue.111 The net revenue for Backpage and its holding company 
increased dramatically throughout the years: in 2012—$71 million, in 
2013—$112.7 million, in 2014—$134.9 million, and in 2015—$153.8 
million.112 Therefore, it is an extremely lucrative business for Backpage, 
and one they have fought to protect. 
B. Case Law 
A case arose out of St. Louis, Missouri in 2011 when a minor victim 
of human trafficking sued Village Voice, the owner of Backpage.com, 
alleging that the company aided and abetted her trafficking and violated 
her primary rights under the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child 
Pornography.113 Plaintiff M.A., a fourteen-year-old runaway child, was 
being sexually trafficked by a female adult who admitted in court that: 
she photographed minor M.A. displaying private body parts in sexual 
pornographic poses; she posted this child pornography on [Backpage’s] 
website, backpage.com in advertisements seeking payment for sex; she 
paid backpage.com for these sex ad postings; she reposted ads; . . . 
[and] she collected money for minor M.A.’s sexual services from these 
customers.
114
 
M.A. alleged that Backpage had knowledge of the explicit sexual 
pornographic photographs that were posted on its website, and by 
allowing the material to appear in search engines, Backpage “facilitated 
child sex trafficking and aided and abetted McFarland in violating” the 
  
 111. Jane Doe No. 1, 817 F.3d at 17; see also Tom Jackman & Jonathan 
O’Connell, Backpage has always claimed it doesn’t control sex-related ads. New 
documents show otherwise, WASH. POST (July 11, 2017), 
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law.115 The court analyzed Section 230 of the CDA by considering the 
text of the statute and the intent of Congress.116 Section 230(f)(3) defines 
an “information content provider” as “any person or entity that is 
responsible . . . for the creation or development of information provided 
through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.”117 The 
court interpreted Section 230(f)(3) along with the fact that no ISP should 
be treated as a publisher for information provided by another content 
provider, as Congress establishing “a general rule that providers of 
interactive computer services are liable only for [the] speech that is 
properly attributable to them.”118 In this situation, Backpage can be 
considered both a service provider and a content provider.119 For 
instance, if a webpage “passively” displays content created by third 
parties, then it is only a service provider.120 However, if a webpage 
creates or develops content, whether in whole or in part, then the website 
is also a content provider.121  
M.A. argued that Backpage is not a service provider for purposes of 
Section 230’s immunity for five reasons. First, Backpage has a search 
engine for adult categories, which allows for keyword searches; second, 
“it developed the value of the posted ads by working to create a highly 
viewed website;” third, its website is considered to be “a highly tuned 
marketing site;” fourth, individuals who pay a fee are given instructions 
on how to increase the impact of the posted ads; and fifth, the website 
offers “special ad placement and re-posting for a fee.”122 The court 
disagreed with Plaintiff M.A. and believed that those characteristics did 
not abrogate Backpage’s immunity.123 Specifically, the court stated that 
the creation of an adult section does not impose liability on Backpage for 
ads posted in that section because the users create the content of the ads 
and select which categories their ads will appear in.124 The Court stated: 
  
 115. Id. at 1044–45.  
 116. Id. at 1047–48.  
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 118. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 2010)). 
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 122. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
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“the only relevant inquiry is whether the interactive service provider 
‘creates’ or ‘develops’ that content.”125 Additionally, the fact that 
Backpage was aware that prior cases of trafficking occurred on its 
website via the ads is not enough to make it the service provider’s own 
content.126 In conclusion, the Court stated: “Congress has declared such 
websites to be immune from suits arising from such injuries;” therefore, 
“[i]t is for Congress to change the policy that gave rise to such 
immunity.”127 
In another attempt to hold Backpage accountable for its role in 
commercial sex trafficking, the prestigious Boston law firm Ropes & 
Gray filed a civil suit on behalf of Jane Does, representing three child sex 
trafficking victims.128 Ropes & Gray filed its lawsuit in U.S. District 
Court in Massachusetts in October 2014, complaining that Backpage 
along with its parent company, “created a business model ‘to knowingly 
promote, support, contribute to and benefit from child sex trafficking in 
the United States’ in violation of federal and Massachusetts law.”129 This 
time, the attorneys argued that Backpage was more than a passive host; 
as stated by the lead attorney John Montgomery, the website was 
“engaged in affirmative conduct, which directly violates a criminal 
statute, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act.”130 Backpage filed a 
successful motion to dismiss the complaint filed by Ropes & Gray “on 
the ground that Backpage is immune from liability under” the CDA.131 
The court stated that the litigation introduced two important public policy 
issues that collided head on—protecting exploited children or protecting 
the internet—and the court interpreted from Section 230 of the CDA that 
Congress chose to protect the internet.132  
  
 125. Id. at 1050 (quoting Goddard v. Google, 2008 WL 5245490, *3 (N. D. Cal. 
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Ropes & Gray then filed an appeal with the First Circuit Court in 
January 2016, but the decision again turned to the immunity provided 
under Section 230.133 Plaintiffs argued that Backpage was a participant in 
the criminal activity because their activities went beyond the scope of 
traditional publishing or editorial functions.134 For instance,  
rules about which terms are permitted or not permitted in a posting, the 
lack of controls on the display of phone numbers, the option to 
anonymize e-mail addresses, the stripping of metadata from 
photographs uploaded to the website, the website’s reaction after a 
forbidden term is entered into an advertisement, and Backpage’s 
acceptance of anonymous payments,
135
  
were examples of how Backpage actively edited the content posted by 
third-parties.  
However, the court disagreed.136 The court reaffirmed previous 
holdings “that a website operator’s decisions in structuring its website 
and posting requirements are publisher functions entitled to section 
230(c)(1) protection.”137 Again, the court focused on Congress’s intent in 
passing Section 230, stating that the CDA was drafted so broadly that 
even if Backpage was “engaged in criminal conduct” it would still be 
immune from liability.138 Refusing to accept the court’s judgment, Ropes 
& Gray filed a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, which was 
denied in January 2017.139  
On the other side of the country, in Seattle, Washington, an attorney 
was able to convince the Supreme Court of Washington to hold in favor 
of Plaintiffs and allow the suit to proceed to trial.140 The case started in 
2012 when three children between the ages of 13 and 15 years old were 
advertised for sex on Backpage and as a result were repeatedly raped by 
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customers.141 The complaint filed against Backpage alleged that they 
“were well aware that their website was being used in this way” because 
they “knowingly developed a nationwide online marketplace for illicit 
commercial sex” and did so “because of the millions of dollars that they 
generated from the website every month.”142 Furthermore, Plaintiffs 
claimed that Backpage developed content requirements that forbade 
sexually explicit language and material; however, that was merely a 
façade.143 Instead, the content requirements were developed to assist 
pimps and traffickers in avoiding law enforcement detection so that 
Backpage could continue profiting from the illegal activities.144 Such 
techniques included “altering ads before publication by deleting words, 
phrases, and images indicative of criminality,” then “publishing the 
‘sanitized’ ads” as well as instructing subscribers on what photographs to 
use, what pricing is allowed, and how to categorize the content.145 
Once again, Backpage argued that it was immune from this lawsuit 
under the CDA.146 However, this case was the first in the country where 
Backpage’s argument was held to be unsubstantiated by the trial court 
and the Washington Supreme Court.147 The Supreme Court stated that the 
blanket immunity provided by the CDA is very dangerous when the 
allegations involve a website knowingly contributing to the illegal 
activity, rather than acting as a passive host.148 This lawsuit was the first 
in the country to defeat the website’s CDA claims, which led to 
Backpage agreeing to a settlement.149 At the closing of the case, one 
Plaintiff stated that, “[t]he CDA should not be a defense to profiting from 
child sex trafficking. Children who are sold for sex online should not be 
told that they are the cost of doing business for technology companies 
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that are older than I am.”150 The hope is that the evidence used to show 
that Backpage created a system designed to promote sex trafficking, not 
prevent it, will assist other cases against the website.151 
C. Congress’s Response 
These cases demonstrated that Congress needed to change the law to 
hold websites like Backpage accountable. After pressure and frustration 
from survivors, victims’ rights advocates, and attorneys, members of 
Congress started to investigate Backpage.152 The Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, chaired by Senator Rob Portman (R-
Ohio) and led by other members, investigated Backpage in 2015.153 The 
investigation started with interviewing Backpage general counsel 
Elizabeth McDougall, but the interview was fruitless, since she was 
unable to answer key questions on the methods used by Backpage to 
screen advertisements for illicit content.154 Therefore, on July 7, 2015, 
the Subcommittee responded by subpoenaing Backpage for documents 
related to its policies and procedures for examining illegal 
advertisements and its communications with law enforcement.155 
However, Backpage refused to produce any documents in response to the 
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subpoena.156 The Subcommittee faced another obstacle when they 
unsuccessfully subpoenaed two Backpage employees, the head of 
Backpage’s moderation department and the supervisor in charge of 
training the moderators, for a deposition because the two employees 
invoked their Fifth Amendment privilege and declined to testify.157  
Afterwards, there were more attempts to acquire documents from 
Backpage, but the company continued to be uncooperative.158 It was not 
until the Senate Legal Counsel brought civil action to enforce the 
subpoena that Backpage produced the documents, totaling 552,983 
documents, comprising 1,112,836 pages.159  The documents, along with 
other investigative efforts, assisted the Subcommittee in issuing its report 
in January 2017.160 The report presented several findings that 
demonstrated Backpage’s involvement in the criminal activity.161 The 
report, titled Backpage.com’s Knowing Facilitation of Online Sex 
Trafficking, contains three principal findings.162 First, “Backpage has 
knowingly concealed evidence of criminality by systematically editing 
its ‘adult’ ads.”163 Second, “Backpage knows that it facilitates 
prostitution and child sex trafficking.”164 Lastly, “despite the reported 
sale of Backpage to an undisclosed foreign company in 2014, the true 
beneficial owners of the company are James Larkin, Michael Lacey, and 
Carl Ferrer.”165 The first two findings are addressed in further detail 
below.  
a. The Report’s Findings 
Based on the evidence gathered and analyzed, the committee 
explained that Backpage “maintained a practice of altering ads before 
publication by deleting words, phrases, and images indicative of illegal 
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transaction.”166 Initially, Backpage instructed its moderators to reject any 
advertisements that referenced acts of prostitution or sex in exchange for 
money.167 However, shortly after that instruction, a new policy was 
implemented that directed Backpage employees “to manually edit the 
language of adult ads to conceal the nature of the underlying 
transaction.”168 This policy first started on an ad hoc basis, but it soon 
developed into a “systematic process.”169 Along with the manual editing, 
Backpage added another function to its automatic filters: “Strip Term 
From Ad.”170 The filter would ban specific words and delete them before 
publication, whereas previously those forbidden terms would have 
resulted in the rejection of the entire ad.171 This new function “concealed 
the illegal nature of countless ads and systematically deleted words 
indicative of criminality, including child sex trafficking and prostitution 
of minors.”172 The Strip Term From Ad filter would automatically delete 
words from the adult ads, such as: “lolita,” “teenage,” “rape,” “young,” 
“amber alert,” “little girl,” “daddy,” “teen,” “fresh,” “innocent,” and 
“school girl,” to make the site cleaner.”173 The email correspondents 
illustrated that CEO Carl Ferrer was not only instructed on which words 
to add to the filter, but he directed or approved the new words and 
understood their implications for child exploitation.174 Additionally, the 
Strip Term From Ad filter was also programmed to “strip scores of 
words indicative of prostitution from ads before publication,” such as 
“full service,” “no limits,” and other common terms describing sexual 
acts.175 Furthermore, anything related to price or time would also be 
deleted, for example, “$50 for 15 minutes.”176 This practice clearly was 
designed to conceal the true nature of the ads and raised questions about 
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how cooperative Backpage truly was with law enforcement.177 It is 
unclear based on the evidence if or when Backpage discontinued the 
filter.178  
After Craigslist shut down its adult section, Backpage began to 
reinstruct its moderators to reject and remove any advertising about sex 
or money because of the public scrutiny the websites were under.179 
However, that policy conflicted with the company’s profit objectives, 
leading the company to abandon it and revert back to editing the ads 
rather than removing the ads entirely.180 Along with the Strip Term From 
Ad filter, the moderators were instructed to manually edit the ads 
afterwards, completely losing the original version of the ad.181 The words 
deleted manually were usually phases that the automatic filter missed due 
to many possible variations, i.e. “yung,” or “$$$j,” or “fu11 serv1ce.”182 
Similarly, Andrew Padilla, the head of Backpage’s moderation 
department, instructed the workers to have these words deleted, and Mr. 
Ferrer was aware of this, since he was copied in many of the emails and 
was told that they were indicative of criminality.183 Lastly, Backpage 
executives instructed moderators to “lock” any sex-for-money ads that 
had been edited by moderators.184 Most of the sites “default settings 
permit[ed] users to edit their own live ads after publication;” however, 
for the adult ads, the lock setting “prevent[ed] users from re-entering the 
language removed during moderation.”185 This meant that “moderators 
routinely edited out clear offer[s] of sex for money, locked out further 
editing, and allowed the ad to go live.”186 A couple of moderators 
testified under oath to the Committee, stating that their responsibility was 
to make sure that sex-for-money postings were clean enough to run live, 
even though it did not change the illegal nature of the advertisement.187 
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The report noted that Backpage eliminated manually editing its ads to a 
certain extent, but the timeline of the policy shift is uncertain.188  
Lastly, Backpage “coached” the creators of  ads with “how tos” for 
posting “clean” content for “[i]llegal ‘[t]ransactions.”189 Ferrer instructed 
that “when a user attempted to post ads with even the most egregious 
banned words, the user would receive an error message identifying the 
problematic word choice.”190 For example, a user was attempting to 
advertise sex with a “teen” in 2012 and received the error message: 
“Sorry, ‘teen’ is a banned term.”191 This error message would allow the 
user to then redraft a cleaner ad and repost it, even though the content 
and the request did not change.192 A similar error message would pop up 
during the age verification process for adult ads.193 If  a user provided an 
age of a minor, then the error stated: “Oops! Sorry, the ad poster must be 
over 18 years of age.”194 The user was again given the opportunity to 
change the age and the ad would go live.195 Based on the Subcommittee’s 
investigation and these findings, the Report asserts that Backpage 
employees and executives know that prostitution and child sex 
trafficking occurs on Backpage, yet they are reluctant to act on such 
knowledge.196 This report sheds light on crucial aspects of Backpage’s 
business philosophy and illustrates that Backpage does in fact possess the 
requisite knowledge for proving criminal liability.  
Surprisingly, after the report and the findings were released, seven top 
officials of Backpage were arrested on a 93-count indictment alleging 
conspiracy, facilitation prostitution and money laundering.197 Of those 
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charged included the site’s founders, Michael Lacy and James Larkin, as 
well as the current chief executive, Carl Ferrer.198 Mr. Ferrer pled guilty 
to charges of money laundering and conspiracy to facilitate prostitution 
and agreed to testify against the co-founders, Lacy and Larkin.199 In his 
plea agreement Ferrer wrote: “I conspired with other Backpage 
principals . . .  to find ways to knowingly facilitate the state-law 
prostitution crimes being committed by Backpage’s customers,” 
including hosting ads of children.200  
b. Amending the Communications Decency Act 
Following the Senate Subcommittee Investigation and findings, the 
Senate introduced an amendment to the Communications Decency Act 
(CDA).201 Senator Rob Portman (R-Ohio) along with nineteen other 
senators introduced the Stop Enabling Sex Trafficking Act of 2017 
(S.1693), receiving bi-partisan support. 202 A similar bill was also 
introduced in the House of Representatives.203 The proposed law would 
clarify three main components of the CDA that have been controversial. 
First, Section 230 does not shield against criminal (state or federal) 
prosecution of minor sex trafficking charges; second, civil lawsuits 
dealing with sex trafficking of minors are not prohibited; and third, ISPs 
who publish information that facilitates sex trafficking are not immune 
from federal liability.204 During the introduction of the bill, Sen. Portman 
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stated: “For too long, courts around the county have ruled that Backpage 
can continue to facilitate illegal sex trafficking online with no 
repercussions. The [CDA] is a well-intentioned law, but it was never 
intended to help protect sex traffickers who prey on the most innocent 
and vulnerable among us.”205  
In response to Congressional action, Backpage closed its adult 
advertising section in January 2017.206 The website received relentless 
pressure from government officials, which, according to Backpage, made 
it too costly to continue its operation of the adult section.207 “For years, 
the legal system protecting freedom of speech prevailed,” Backpage 
stated, “but new government tactics, including pressuring credit card 
companies to cease doing business with Backpage, have left the 
company with no other choice but to remove the content in the United 
States.”208 Now, when entering Backpage’s adult section it states: 
“CENSORED” – “The government has unconstitutionally censored this 
content.”209 However, does this mean that ads displaying illegal sexual 
content are completely gone? According to law enforcement officials and 
anti-sex trafficking groups, the ads (along with the people being 
advertised) have just moved to a new location.210 Lt. Curtis Williams, 
who is a police officer in Atlanta, explained: “They have just moved 
from the Adult section to what Backpage terms as the Dating section.”211 
A search of Backpage’s dating section uncovers similar postings and 
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phrases used to solicit sexual services.212 Therefore, it is unclear if this is 
a ploy to mislead the public and members of Congress, or if Backpage is 
actually serious about preventing human trafficking.  
Despite the criticism and attacks the bill received,213 the final bill, 
titled Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 
2017 (H.R. 1865),214 was passed by the House on February 27, 2018 and 
by the Senate on March 21, 2018.215 On April 11, 2018, President Donald 
Trump signed the bill into law, marking a significant step forward to 
holding sites responsible for sex-trafficking ads.216 The Act starts off by 
proclaiming that the Communications Decency Act “was never intended 
to provide legal protection to websites that unlawfully promote and 
facilitate prostitution and websites that facilitate traffickers in advertising 
the sale of unlawful sex acts with sex trafficking victims.”217 The Act, 
also referred to as “FOSTA,” not only limits the immunity for ISPs 
provided under Section 230 of the CDA, but it also encourages ISPs to 
“exercise greater responsibility over sex-trafficking related content,” and 
provides law enforcement and prosecutors new avenues to pursue those 
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criminally responsible.218 As discussed above, the CDA provided an 
exception to the immunity for federal criminal violations; however, 
FOSTA takes it a step further and removes CDA immunity for ISPs with 
respect to state criminal charges if the underlying crime falls within a 
violation of the anti sex-trafficking statutes described in FOSTA.219 Most 
notably, FOSTA also removes immunity against civil liability suits 
brought by victims against ISPs who “knowingly promot[e] or 
facilitate[e] sex trafficking through such activities as hosting third-party 
posts, listings and advertisements.”220   
IV. EUROPE 
Human Trafficking in the Europe Union has been classified as “one of 
the most prevalent” forms of organized crime.221 As a result, Member 
State law enforcement agencies have prioritized and concentrated 
resources to address this problem.222 In the past decade, Member State 
authorities have noticed a “considerable increase in intra-EU 
trafficking.”223 According to Europol, there was a significant increase in 
the number of registered victims and suspects reported between 2013-
2014.224 For instance, in 2013, 3,910 suspects and 3,315 victims were 
identified; whereas in 2014, 4,127 suspects and 4,185 victims were 
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identified.225 The trends are not linked to any particular reason, but 
Europol has been increasingly assisting Member State law enforcement 
for operational support during cross-border trafficking investigations.226 
Furthermore, the majority of the registered victims, 71%, were EU 
citizens, demonstrating that the problem is not only prevalent in the EU, 
but it affects EU nationals.227   
Sexual exploitation is the most reported form of human trafficking in 
Europe, and most of the victims are female and EU nationals from 
Central and Eastern Europe.228 Figuratively, “570 victims of sexual 
exploitation were identified by Europol . . . [and approximately] 95% 
were adult victims and 5%” were minors in 2014.”229 The victims are 
usually forced into prostitution, and if prostitution is illegal in a country, 
then the victim’s services are advertised within the “dark market” 
through various avenues, such as escort and/or dating websites.230 
Europol has also recognized an increase in the number of advertisements 
used to sexually exploit children.231  
A. Websites Involved in Human Trafficking  
Even though Backpage exists in over 90 countries,232 including parts 
of Europe, it does not receive the same attention for contributing to 
human trafficking as it does in the U.S. Europol has identified key 
networks where online child sexual exploitation occurs, such as peer-to-
peer services, Darknet webpages, escort services, and live-streaming 
platforms.233 For instance, there was a case involving females who were 
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transported from Estonia into Finland to be sexually exploited and 
advertised online by Estonian and Finnish criminals.234 In Estonia, the 
most popular website where sexual exploitation commonly occurs is 
Rate.ee, which has 360,000 registered users; 130,000 users a day; 
350,000 visits per week; and 19 million pages displayed per day.235 In 
this case, the traffickers managed to recruit the women and girls and 
force them into prostitution while serving time in an Estonian prison.236 
The three men were all part of the business scheme and used their 
girlfriends/wives to assist in the process.237 The men smuggled phones 
into the prison and then started to communicate with the young women 
on Rate.ee.238 Once the women arrived, they were photographed and 
advertised on another Finnish adult website, sihteeriopisto.net.239 This 
investigation yielded that a total of fifteen Estonian women were 
trafficked to Finland between October 2005 – March 2006.240 This case 
was the first trafficking conviction in Finland,241 and the parties involved 
were convicted of aggravated human trafficking and pimping and their 
sentences ranged from 2-5 years imprisonment.242 Mr. Nick Garlick, an 
Intelligence Officer for the Crimes Against Persons Unit at Europol, 
explained that the operation was “highly sophisticated” and “utilized 
fully the internet to advertise its ‘products’”243 After representatives from 
Europol, Eurojust, and the Finish Police met at the Council of Europe 
Seminar on the Misuse of the Internet, they started to investigate the ISPs 
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liability in this case.244 However, it is unclear if anything resulted from 
the investigation.  
The Internet is a main source for advertising women and girls 
available for sexual services to buyers, and the Netherlands is no 
exception.245 One of the most popular websites in the Netherlands is 
hookers.nl.246 The website went live in 2002 and within four years it had 
“formally registered” approximately 80,000 active members.247 The only 
language option on this website is Dutch.248 The website not only has 
online advertisements, but it also provides addresses and options for 
where to go to receive prostitution services for its clientele.249 Due to the 
website’s possible ties to human trafficking, hookers.nl took part in the 
Appearances Deceive campaign, which started in January 2006 by the 
Report Crime Anonymously Foundation financed by the Ministry of 
Justice.250 The objective of the campaign was to help users of these 
websites identify and recognize signs of human trafficking or forced 
prostitution and anonymously report their suspicions.251 Hookers.nl 
endorsed the campaign and spread the information on its website for 
users to utilize if they witnessed something criminal.252  
Similar sentiments about prosecuting websites who fail to take down 
sexually explicit photographs of children are arising out of Britain as 
well.253  British Prime Minister Theresa May’s “ethics watchdog” 
requested that the government take action to address the issue of ISP 
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liability for websites who host “racist, extremist, and child sex abuse 
material.”254 David Westlake, head of anti-slavery group International 
Justice Mission UK, stated: “Internet service providers, are increasingly 
finding their . . . platforms as vulnerable mediums for exploitation and 
abuse.”255 Therefore, businesses have a critical role in ensuring child 
safety and should have a statutory obligation if they fail to monitor and 
take down illegal content.256 Similar to the U.S., debates are arising in the 
UK about the degree of care companies should exercise over what is 
posted on their platforms and what they should be shielded from.257 An 
advocate from Anti-Slavery International stated: “[T]hey shouldn’t just 
be able to sit back and allow content constituting child sexual abuse on 
their sites.”258 Currently, social media companies and ISPs do not have 
liability for the content on their sites, even if it is illegal due to the E-
Commerce Directive (discussed in detail below).259 Therefore, the 
Committee on Standards in Public Life made the recommendation to 
shift liability in its recent report.260 The Committee stated: “[r]evising 
this legal framework which applies to the social media companies would 
incentivize the prompt, automated identification of illegal content.”261 It 
appears that the traction the U.S. is receiving for altering its laws is 
setting an example for other countries to follow.262   
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B. EU Laws on Human Trafficking and the Internet   
On an international level, there are no binding policies addressing 
trafficking online.263 However, there are several other policies that exist 
for EU Member States that address this issue.264 The EU is comprised of 
twenty-eight European States, however, each State maintains its 
sovereignty because “the EU does not legislate or implement policy on 
purely national matters.”265 Instead, “the Union only acts where action 
will be more effective at EU level than at national level.”266 Therefore, 
since the issues of human trafficking and child sexual exploitation 
require international collaboration, the EU has released a few relevant 
Directives (or legislation) to address and combat them.267 The three 
Directives are: 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in 
human beings and protecting its victims; 2011/93/EU on combating the 
sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child 
pornography;268 and 2000/31/EU on certain legal aspects of information 
society services, in particular, electronic commerce.269 Directives are 
binding upon Members States and set a goal that must be achieved by 
national governments by a specified date.270 However, national 
governments are able to decide in what manner it wishes to meet the 
goals outlined in the Directive.271 “The EU has the power to determine 
the broad approach, but cannot prescribe how [M]ember [S]tates 
implement policy or which agencies take responsibility for the 
changes.”272 In addition to the Directives, the twenty-eight EU Member 
States are part of the Council of Europe, which establishes Conventions 
to tackle important issues.273 If Members States voluntarily sign onto a 
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Convention, than they are obligated to abide by the text of the Council 
Convention.274 The main instruments that address human trafficking 
prevention are two Council of Europe Conventions: the Convention on 
Action against Trafficking in Human Beings and the Convention on 
Cybercrime.275  
First, the Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings 
was adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 
May 3, 2005, after a series of other initiatives were introduced to combat 
human trafficking.276 The Convention, however, did not enter into force 
until February 1, 2008, following its tenth ratification.277 The Convention 
addresses a wide range of issues and encompasses all forms of 
trafficking, i.e. national or transnational, linked to organized crime or 
not, sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or similar 
practices, servitude, and organ removal.278 Additionally, the Convention 
recognizes that victims of trafficking include men, women, and 
children.279 The Convention has a victim-centered approach by defining 
human trafficking “as a violation of human rights and an offence to the 
dignity and integrity of the human being.”280 This is an important 
approach because it frames the way Members States address the issue, 
especially with regards to online human trafficking.281 Lastly, the 
Convention sets up monitoring mechanisms to ensure that parties abide 
by its provisions in practice.282 Since 2008, there have been forty-seven 
ratifications of the Convention.283 The Convention, following the 
definition laid out in the Palermo Protocol, defines trafficking to include 
the three main factors: force, fraud, or coercion.284 The document does 
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not specifically address online forms of trafficking; however, an 
inference can be drawn to include Internet exploitation based on its broad 
definitions and scope.285 Therefore, for purposes of liability, the internet 
is covered.286 
Second, the Cybercrime Convention, which was signed in Budapest 
on November 23, 2001 and has been in force since July 1, 2004, is the 
main internationally binding legal instrument on cybercrime.287 Even 
though the Cybercrime Convention does not directly address human 
trafficking, Article 9 focuses on sexual exploitation of children, making 
it a criminal offense “not only to produce child pornography for 
distribution via computer, but also to offer it, make it available, 
distribute, transmit or procure it via computer, or possess it in a computer 
system.”288 Additionally, this Convention offers procedural and 
investigative tools to assist police departments throughout the world in 
combatting illegal activity committed on or via the Internet, including 
human trafficking.289 One of the investigative tools provided by this 
Convention is the ability of authorities to compel service providers to 
provide content data, in real time, of “specified communications in its 
territory transmitted by means of a computer system.”290 Furthermore, if 
the “requested Party discovers that a service provider in another State 
was involved in the transmission of the communication,” then the 
requested Party is obligated to “expeditiously disclose to the requesting 
Party” information to identify that service provider and any 
communication that was transmitted.291 Article 1 of the Cybercrime 
Convention defines “service provider” as:  
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i. any public or private entity that provides to users of its service the 
ability to communicate by means of a computer system, and 
ii. any other entity that processes or stores computer data on behalf of 
such communication service or users of such service.
292
 
The Cybercrime Convention does not separate the issue of third party 
content hosted by internet service providers.293 Instead, it holds all 
internet service providers accountable for the material that is 
communicated or stored on its service, especially with regards to child 
pornography, since Article 9 encompasses all forms, from producing to 
offering, distributing, transmitting, or possessing child pornography.294 
When assessing the compatibility of the two Council of Europe 
Conventions, it appears as though the Anti-Trafficking Convention’s 
criminal provisions and the investigative tools provided for in the 
Cybercrime Convention comprehensively address the issues of internet 
trafficking of human beings.295 For example, law enforcement authorities 
can use the “production orders” referred to in Article 18 of the 
Cybercrime Convention “to compel suspects to release specified 
computer-stored data in their possession or under their control.”296 
Similarly, authorities have access to “‘expedited preservation of stored 
computer data’ (Article 17), ‘search and seizure of stored computer data’ 
(Article 19), [and] ‘real-time collection of traffic data’ (Article 20).”297 
These investigative tools are very important for the investigation and 
prosecution of trafficking offenses committed online.298 
The two Directives on trafficking issued by the EU follow the 
sentiments of the Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human 
Beings. Directive 2011/36/EU defines the subject matter (Article 1); lists 
the offences concerning trafficking, ranging from sexual exploitation and 
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forced labor to forced begging and forced marriages299 (Article 2); and 
details the penalties associated with the crime (Article 4).300 Most 
notably, Articles 13 to 16 recognize the particular vulnerabilities of 
children and set out mechanisms to support and protect child victims.301 
Directive 2011/93/EU criminalizes offenses concerning sexual 
exploitation of children, including child prostitution and pornography.302 
Interestingly, the Directive includes the elements of force, fraud, and 
coercion even for children, whereas under U.S. law, the elements are not 
required for criminalization if a minor is involved because the law 
automatically assumes that one of those elements exist for a minor who 
legally cannot consent.303 The Directive is not limited to “offline 
exploitation,” but includes information communicated or solicited via 
technology as a form of sexual exploitation, an important step in 
recognizing the increase in online sexual exploitation.304 The purpose of 
this Directive is to “harmonise legislation across EU members, 
establishing minimal rules concerning the definition and sanctions 
related to child sexual exploitation.”305 This Directive is very important 
because it creates one source that combines several years of EU 
legislation on trafficking and child sexual exploitation.306 Furthermore, 
this Directive allows Member States to remove or block websites that 
contain or spread child pornography, but this portion of the legislation 
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fueled many heated debates.307 One argument is that deletion of such 
sites may take too long, and therefore, is not a quick enough response,308 
while the time needed to block a website requires minutes, not hours or 
days.309 For instance, the International Watch Foundation (IWF) reported 
that within 60 minutes it was able to block 43% of UK based websites 
that contained child sexual abuse content, but removal took days.310  
Furthermore, INHOPE311 reported that “worldwide on average 93% of 
these sites are removed within a week,” and IWF shared similar findings 
estimating that in Europe it took 10 days to remove 91% of these illegal 
websites.312 The time lapse is dangerous because the amount of time it 
takes to remove a website, compared to the minutes it takes to block, 
creates a window of opportunity for the “operators to multiply, move or 
transfer content to other hosts.”313 Therefore, a key child protection 
measure in the EU is blocking such websites.314 
Lastly, Directive 2000/31/EC issued on electronic communications 
does not directly deal with human trafficking, but it addresses the 
regulation and liability of providers and intermediaries of online content, 
which is crucial for online sexual exploitation.315 Under Article 15 of  
2000/31/EC, providers do not have a general obligation “to monitor the 
information which they transmit or store” or “actively to seek facts or 
circumstances indicating illegal activity.”316 Therefore, a service provider 
cannot be held liable for being a “mere conduit.”317 However, if a service 
provider initiates the transmission, selects the receiver of the 
transmission, or modifies the information contained in the transmission, 
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then the provider can be held liable.318 Additionally, if the service 
provider had actual knowledge of illicit content or became aware of 
illicit content and did not act promptly to remove it or block access to it, 
then liability exists.319 Part 2 of Article 15 requests service providers to 
inform law enforcement promptly “of alleged illegal activities 
undertaken or information provided by recipients of their service.”320 
However, in practice, service providers do not always follow this 
procedure, unless the information is requested by authorities in specific 
cases.321 Consequently, since monitoring is not required, providers 
cannot be instructed by Member States to screen for illegal content 
hosted or shared on its platforms.322 Based on Article 15 of the Directive, 
providers are exempt unless they have actual knowledge of illegal 
content within their services.323 
C. EU Member States’ Legal Measures  
European Union Member States have been working towards 
implementing laws that address both ISPs and trafficking in human 
persons for purposes of sexual exploitation.324 Much work remains, but 
many countries have made progress. The majority of the EU Member 
States have ratified or signed both the Council of Europe’s Convention 
on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings and the Cybercrime 
Convention, as well as adopted certain aspects of Directive 2000/31.325 
For instance, Romania is the only EU member country to have ratified 
both Conventions; whereas, Belgium, Italy, Germany, Greece, Poland, 
Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have merely signed the 
Conventions.326 Other countries, such as Denmark, Croatia, Cyprus, and 
Estonia have only ratified the Cybercrime Convention.327  
  
 318. Id.  
 319. Id. art. 14.  
 320. Id. art. 15.  
 321. Sykiotou, supra note 56, at 73.  
 322. Id.  
 323. Id.  
 324. See id. at 75.  
 325. Id. at 76; see also About the Convention, supra note 276.  
 326. Id. at 76–92.  
 327. Id.  
2019] Human Trafficking in a Digital Age 581
  
Some countries have developed other measures to assist victims of 
online sexual exploitation. For instance, the UK established the Internet 
Watch Foundation (IWF).328 IWF “is the only authorised organisation in 
the UK operating an internet ‘Hotline’ for the public and IT professionals 
to report their exposure to potentially illegal content online.”329 IWF 
collaborates with UK Government departments, such as the Home Office 
and the Department of Trade and Industry, as well as law enforcement 
agencies like CEOP Centre, Interpol, Europol, and local forces.330 The 
aim of IWF is to minimize the availability of potentially illegal content, 
such as child sexual abuse images and other criminally obscene 
content.331 The public is able to report suspected online child sexual 
abuse images anonymously and then IWF analysts assess the reports and 
remove the content.332 IMF is able to remove content based on case law 
and various legal guidelines, such as the 2000/31/EU Directive 
mentioned above.333 For the last two decades, IWF has evaluated roughly 
700,000 reports, 281,781 of which depicted child sexual content.334 
Currently, IWF assesses over 1,000 websites per week and is able to 
remove the content in the UK within two hours.335 Furthermore, as a 
“direct result of [its] work, child sexual abuse content hosted in the UK 
has reduced from 18% in 1996 to below 1% today.”336  
Additionally, some Member States have relied on “less formal 
mechanisms designed to encourage ISPs to eliminate child pornography 
from their systems and to collaborate with law enforcement to identify 
those responsible for disseminating contraband.”337 For example, in 
Cyprus, if an ISP is informed by authorities or has actual knowledge that 
child exploitation content appears on its website, then the ISP has a duty 
  
 328. Internet Misuse Seminar, supra note 234, at 49.  
 329. Id.  
 330. Id. at 49–50. 
 331. What we do, INTERNET WATCH FOUND., https://www.iwf.org.uk/what-we-do 
(last visited Feb. 07, 2018).  
 332. Id.  
 333. Id. at The laws and assessment levels.  
 334. Id. at What we do.  
 335. Id.  
 336. Id.  
 337. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GLOBAL ALLIANCE AGAINST CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE ONLINE 
34 (2015).  
582 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 27.3
   
to restrict access to the illicit content regardless of a court order.338 
Similar legislation was implemented in Greece as well.339 Other Member 
States, such as Bulgaria, hosted a conference in partnership with its five 
largest Internet providers to explore and analyze possible solutions to 
combat online sexual exploitation of children.340 The representatives who 
attended volunteered to participate in a pilot program aimed at 
“develop[ing] a model for blocking certain domain addresses” known to 
contain materials involving the sexual exploitation of children.341 
Furthermore, countries such as Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, and Ireland 
have implemented “successful blocking or filtering schemes, either 
legally mandated or voluntary on the part of the ISPs.”342  
V. ANALYSIS  
The international community recognizes that the Internet is a new 
means for human trafficking; however, not everyone agrees on how to 
address the issue of participating ISPs. It is evident that lawmakers both 
in the EU and the U.S. believe that ISPs should be held legally liable if 
they knowingly facilitate or modify illegal content, especially sexually 
explicit photographs of minors.343 However, some critics complain that 
targeting websites like Backpage “will only displace the sex ads to other 
websites” and that closing sites down that have adult ads does not 
“address the underlying problem of adult male demand for underage 
commercial sex.”344 The concern is that by shutting down certain 
websites, the content will just be moved to the dark web, foreign sites, or 
small sites, where tracking down the traffickers and helping the victims 
becomes much more difficult.345 Law enforcement officials are put in a 
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difficult situation, especially in the U.S., because they rely on 
Backpage’s cooperation for information to locate missing children; 
information that would not be as easily accessible if the traffickers turned 
elsewhere.346 For instance, a police sergeant from Minneapolis, who has 
been fighting human trafficking for more than twenty years, stated, 
“Backpage is far more responsive to [my] requests for help than phone 
companies or social media, and [I have] run into dead ends trying to get 
information from non-U.S. websites.”347 The reliance by law 
enforcement officers on websites such as Craigslist and Backpage is 
obvious, another officer stated, “[g]etting rid of Craigslist.com was 
actually a disservice to law enforcement because they were cooperating. 
They are legitimate business but they just have this illegitimate side.”348 
Ironically, law enforcement recognize the illegality and danger of these 
websites, but they prefer to keep them running because it requires less 
resources and makes their jobs easier.349 But are those good enough 
reasons to allow the illegality to continue? Other stakeholders have 
different opinions: “[t]he fact that taking out one sex trafficker doesn’t 
solve the problem doesn’t mean you shouldn’t take it on, particularly 
when it’s the most pervasive.”350 A Sheriff from Cook County, Illinois, 
who has attempted to shut down Backpage previously, explained, “[w]e 
can’t have something that’s right in front of our faces, so actively 
involved with different crimes. We can’t just stand there and do nothing. 
It could get worse? Its’s already pretty bad.”351 It is difficult to know 
whether or not the isolated cases Backpage has assisted with is enough to 
overlook the fact that an overwhelming number of victims are trafficked 
through Backpage.352 
It is unclear how interactive law enforcement agencies in the EU deal 
with websites who advertise “adult content,” since there is not just one 
main website like Backpage. However, law enforcement officials of 
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certain Member States actively monitor online classifieds for evidence of 
human trafficking.353 For instance, in Greece, the Computer Crime Unit 
discovered a website advertising the sexual services of “famous models” 
while screening for such content.354 The police posed as clients, booked 
the website’s services, and came across women who were being 
trafficked.355 As a result, the website was shut down.356 However, as 
discussed above, shutting down a website is not necessarily the best and 
fastest method to remove child abuse content.357 Therefore, countries 
should consider temporary solutions such as blocking the webpage, so 
that the content does not stay visible during the time it takes for a website 
to be shutdown.358 Similarly, not all EU Member States agree that 
shutting down online classifieds is the only solution.359 Britain’s Prime 
Minister, Theresa May, stated that “[w]eb companies must do more to 
stop victims of modern slavery being sold and exploited over the 
internet.”360 She further explained that “Internet companies cannot stand 
by while their platforms are used to facilitate child abuse, [and] modern 
slavery.”361 Many advocates in the U.S. agree, urging that ISPs need to 
be more proactive in their approaches.362 Websites could be a great 
partner in combatting human trafficking, but they need to be willing to 
actively make changes and cooperate with law enforcement to detect 
illegal content.363  
Oddly, the U.S. and the EU currently have very similar laws on the 
books for shielding ISPs that feature illegal content. When reviewing 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act and EU Directive 
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2000/31, the similarities are uncanny.364 Both the CDA and the Directive 
have provisions for merely being a host—that is, the provider’s 
relationship to the content is considered to be passive and technical.365 In 
other words, online intermediaries that host or spread speech are 
protected against being considered the developer and are thereby also 
protected against any liability.366 Furthermore, both acts have a good 
faith provision that states a provider will not be held liable if they 
observe obscene or objectionable things and take action to restrict 
access.367 However, the Directive takes it a step further by stating that a 
service provider cannot have actual knowledge of illegal activity or 
information, and if it obtains such knowledge, it must act “expeditiously” 
to remove the content.368 Even though the CDA does not include the 
language about knowledge, certain U.S. courts have expressed that 
immunity is not enforceable if a website knowingly contributes and 
assists with the development of the illegal content and does not act as 
passive host.369 Additionally, the release of the Subcommittee Report and 
the amendment to Section 230 demonstrates that websites who 
knowingly facilitate child sex trafficking will no longer be considered 
hosts of third-party content and can be held liable.370 Therefore, it 
appears that the U.S. might incorporate that aspect of the Directive into 
its law. 
The main difference between Section 230 of the CDA and EU 
Directive 2000/31is that the Directive directly states in Article 15 that no 
Member State is allowed to impose on the providers the duty to monitor 
content for illegal activity.371 Under EU law, this means that ISPs “are 
legally envisaged to have a passive, rather than proactive, role in 
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identifying and removing illegal content.”372 Since EU Member States 
are prohibited from enforcing such measures, the only options are to 
either change the language of the Directive or have Member States 
withdraw from the EU.373 For instance, in the UK, there has been a push 
towards introducing laws that would shift the liability for child sex abuse 
material and other illegal content onto web firms.374 However, in order 
for the UK to “tip the balance of liability,” it must cease to have 
obligations under EU law.375 Therefore, it may be advantageous for the 
EU to edit its monitoring regulations, since websites already use their 
own algorithms to analyze and select content based on various factors.376 
Shifting the legal framework to fit the current times “would help remove 
the current perverse incentives for companies to avoid any form of active 
moderation using machine learning.”377   
The legal protections provided by the U.S. through the CDA and the 
EU through the Directive exist to allow high levels of internet access and 
to protect the right to freedom of speech.378 Technology companies have 
adamantly described their sites as enabling communication, rather than 
publishing or creating content; therefore, they have vocalized their 
opposition to altering laws that would “jeopardize a free and open 
internet.”379 On the other hand, both the U.S. and the EU have 
implemented comprehensive anti-human trafficking legislation.380 The 
U.S. established the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), which 
  
 372. COMM. ON STANDARDS IN PUB. LIFE, supra note 260, at 35. 
 373. See e.g., id.  
 374. Id.  
 375. Id.; see also Brexit: Your simple guide to the UK leaving the EU, BBC NEWS 
(Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-46318565 (explaining that the UK has 
since decided to withdraw from the EU).  
 376. E-commerce Directive, supra note 259.   
 377. COMM. ON STANDARDS IN PUB. LIFE, supra note 260, at 36. 
 378. See generally CDA 230: Legislative History, supra note 82.  
 379. See Cecilia Kang, In Reversal, Tech Companies Back Sex Trafficking Bill, 
NY TIMES (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/03/technology/sex-
trafficking-bill.html; see also Tom Jackman, Tech Companies push back as Congress 
tries to fight online sex trafficking, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2017) (companies described 
the bill as “a mistake of historic proportions,” and stated that the CDA is a “bedrock legal 
protection for online services” because without its protection, websites would be 
discouraged “from aggressively policing their content.”).    
 380. See supra Part III, Part IV Section B.  
2019] Human Trafficking in a Digital Age 587
  
states that it is a criminal offense to traffic human beings and provides 
certain civil remedies;381 whereas the EU has the two Directives—one on 
preventing and combatting trafficking in human beings and protecting 
victims (2011/36/EU), and the other on combating sexual abuse and 
sexual exploitation of children and child pornography (2011/93/EU).382  
Not to mention, the two Council of Europe Conventions on Cybercrime 
and Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings.383 Therefore, both 
regions have two very important laws, one protecting freedom of speech 
and the other protecting victims of human trafficking. Here, the problem 
is not that the appropriate legislation does not exist, it is that the 
legislations clash. As a result, a new balance has to be formed because 
ISPs should not be considered full publishers of the content on their sites, 
but they also cannot be considered as mere platforms when they 
knowingly facilitate child sexual abuse.  
The case of Backpage is a perfect example of striking that balance and 
preventing an ISP from crossing the line and profiting off of someone 
else’s victimization.384 From one of the early lawsuits against Backpage, 
the court made it clear that once a website creates or develops the 
content, it can no longer be thought of solely as a service provider.385 The 
First Circuit Court reaffirmed previous holdings by stating that an ISP’s 
decision on how it structures its website or what posting requirements it 
has are merely publisher functions, not content development.386 
However, it was recently uncovered that Backpage was doing exactly 
what the Courts said was not protected by Section 230 of the CDA: it 
was acting as a creator.387 The Senate Subcommittee Report shed light on 
the fact that Backpage instructed its moderators to modify and alter ads 
before publication so that they appear “clean” and are undetected by law 
enforcement, instead of removing them.388 Backpage not only edited the 
content of the ads, but it also instructed traffickers and pimps on what 
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was appropriate and legal, even though Backpage had knowledge that by 
doing so they were facilitating prostitution and child sex trafficking.389  
A similar argument was made in front of the Washington Supreme 
Court in J.S. v. Village Voice Holdings, where the plaintiffs asserted that 
Backpage acted beyond its publishing duties when it developed and 
required content requirements for sex advertisements of underage girls 
and profited from those advertisements.390 This time, the Court agreed 
with the plaintiffs, and the case was not automatically dismissed because 
of Section 230 of the CDA.391 Arguably, when an ISP, especially one that 
offers escort or dating services, crosses the line and develops, modifies, 
or instructs the content of an advertisement, it must be held liable for its 
role in the criminal activity.392 In this instance, Backpage did not actively 
assist law enforcement in detecting child sex trafficking ads, it did not 
remove ads that were indicative of child prostitution, and it did not act as 
a passive host.393 Therefore, Backpage’s right to free speech cannot and 
should not be protected, since the website was actively and knowingly 
engaged in the sexual exploitation of minors.394 This sort of standard 
needs to be implemented both in the U.S. and in the EU in order to hold 
certain ISPs accountable for their role in facilitating sex trafficking.  
Another important consideration when comparing the two approaches 
to ISP liability is the fact that the U.S. is more of a litigious country than 
Member States in the EU.395 In the U.S., people and businesses often fear 
being sued for frivolous actions.396 As a result, the CDA is endorsed by 
the technology industry, because it not only protects the First 
Amendment right to Freedom of Speech, but it also protects ISPs from 
potential lawsuits for the actions of others.397 By contrast, “Europeans do 
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not operate under the constant specter of litigation.”398 During the course 
of this research, finding a lawsuit against an ISP in the U.S. was quite 
simple; however, it was very difficult to track down similar lawsuits in 
one of the twenty-eight Member States of the EU. This discrepancy 
exists because Europe has more rules and regulations, yet tighter 
enforcement of those rules, which means that private litigation is less 
common.399 The difference is not only a policy preference, but one 
deeply rooted in tradition.400 Furthermore, many European countries have 
implemented a ‘loser pays’ policy in civil cases,  which essentially deters 
frivolous claims because if the individual who is suing loses, then he or 
she is responsible for paying the other side’s costs.401 The purpose of this 
article is not to examine which system is better or more advantageous, 
but it is an important factor when considering the practical consequences 
of changing ISP liability. In the EU, the issue turns to whether victims 
will have an actual civil recourse and remedy, or if it will primarily 
involve criminal liability, whereas in the U.S., the concern is whether the 
lawsuits will be taken seriously. As previously mentioned, the U.S. 
Congress amended the CDA and only time will tell what the practical 
implications are, however, if the language is crafted narrowly enough 
and aimed at the actual purpose, then First Amendment rights will not be 
infringed upon.  
Liability is not the only solution to combatting online sex trafficking. 
Internet service providers are not the source of the problem,402 since 
human trafficking existed before the internet and will continue to exist 
without it.403 Therefore, law enforcement agencies should partner with 
ISPs in order to receive the technical assistance required to stop the 
sexual exploitation of children.404 Technology can be used as an 
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intervention for human trafficking, instead of a tool for traffickers and 
pimps.405 Programs and software, such as photo recognition and flagging, 
have been developed and can be used to detect such illegal content.406 
For instance, Google “develop[ed] a tool that scans online ads to flag 
possible child victims for anti-exploitation charity Thorn,”407 and 
Microsoft-created “PhotoDNA, which [assists] in identifying images of 
children who are sexually exploited.”408 Therefore, online classified 
websites can take a proactive role and aid law enforcement in removing 
illicit activity, identifying patterns, locating possible victims, and 
collecting data to track down assailants.409 Additionally, ISPs can partner 
with human trafficking hotlines or anti-trafficking campaigns and post 
helpful information on their websites so participants or outsiders can 
identify victims, just like hookers.nl did with the Appearances Deceive 
campaign.410 Finally, data retention and preservation provisions help 
ensure that digital evidence is available to law enforcement.411 Therefore, 
ISPs should be required to develop and implement data retention policies 
that collect both content-based data, such as the actual text of the 
advertisement, and non-content based data, such as subscriber 
information ranging from personal to traffic data.412 If ISPs retain data, 
they would be able to assist law enforcement in tracking down missing 
and exploited children.413  
Cooperation between law enforcement agencies and ISPs is essential 
in order to effectively combat online sexual exploitation. Such 
collaborative efforts are visible in EU Member States who have turned to 
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informal mechanisms in order to detect and remove sexually explicit 
content of children.414 In the U.S., Cook County Sheriff, Tom Dart, stated 
that he wrote to Backpage providing suggestions on how to better 
monitor their ads, such as hiring retired police detectives to assist in 
identifying illegal content.415 Dart explained, “they [Backpage] 
theoretically could be a great partner.”416 In accordance with this 
principal of collaboration, the European Commission announced a set of 
“guidelines and principles” aimed at working with technology platforms 
to takedown illegal content more effectively and efficiently.417 The 
Commission urged that “they build tools to automate flagging and re-
uploading” of illegal content.418 Vice President of the EU’s Digital Single 
Market, Andrus Ansip, described the partnership between the 
Commission and technology platforms as a safeguard, stating the 
guidance “avoid[s] over-removal and ensure[s] transparency and the 
protection of fundamental rights such as freedom of speech.”419 Another 
important step toward this cooperation unfolded in the U.S. when big 
internet companies, including Facebook and Google, agreed to withdraw 
their opposition to the legislation, which helped clear the path for the 
FOSTA legislation to be passed.420  
VI. CONCLUSION  
Online sexual exploitation of children continues to pose serious 
challenges to the international community. Fortunately, the U.S. and EU 
Member States are on the right track to combat this issue. However, there 
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is still more work to be accomplished, since newer and more advanced 
technologies are created every day, giving traffickers more ways to 
exploit their victims. Comprehensive substantive laws already exist that 
criminalize the facilitation of human trafficking,421 but now those laws 
need to expand to hold all parties accountable, including ISPs. 
Backpage’s active concealment of criminality and its altering of ads is 
unacceptable behavior that should not be protected by the 
Communications Decency Act.422 Any website that engages in such 
conduct should be held legally (both civilly and criminally) accountable 
for its role in exploiting minors for a profit. In order to deter websites 
from participating in human trafficking, civil legal consequences need to 
exist.423 If the legal consequences are severe enough, ISPs would be 
incentivized to cooperate and collaborate with law enforcement agencies. 
EU Member States have demonstrated various ways in which they are 
partnering with ISPs in order to better approach this problem.424 Such 
cooperation with the private sector will not only keep sexually explicit 
ads of children off the Internet, but it can help “prevent, detect, and 
disrupt online child sexual abuse and exploitation and to identify and 
prosecute offenders.”425  
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